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Righting the Writing. 
The Power Dynamic of Soviet Ukraine Language Policies 
and Reforms in the 1920s-1930s 
The historical and current situations of the Ukrainian language offer perhaps an es-
pecially	graphic	illustration	of	Jacques	Derrida’s	well	known	paradox:	“We	only	ever	speak	
one language… (yes, but) We never speak only one language…” (Derrida 1996: 10). The cur-
rent existence of minimum four varieties of standard Ukrainian (Danylenko 2015: 242) has 
deep roots in the history of political divisions and extensive language contact. As posited 
by	George	Ševel’ov	(1996)	and	increasingly	established	in	contemporary	studies,	“standard	
Ukrainian	is	a	pluricentric	language	which,	contrary	to	its	exclusively	‘Kyjiv-Poltava’	foun-
dational myth, has undergone both centripetal and centrifugal codification” (Danylenko 
2015: 243). From the perspective of political centralisation, this has always been perceived 
as	 a	deficiency,	 lamented	by	Ahatanhel	Kryms’kyj	 (1927:	 342):	 “As	we	 regretfully	know	
from everyday experience, there are still two literary Ukrainian languages”. 
This deficiency was precisely what the Orthographic Commission of the Ukrainian 
People’s	Commissariat	 for	Education	 (Narkompros),	 created	 in	 1925,	 and	 the	First	All-
Ukrainian Orthographic Conference, summoned in Charkiv in 1927, sought to eliminate. 
It led consequently to the first comprehensive spelling reform that codified a single lit-
erary standard Ukrainian based on two extant literary standards, the Western-Ukrainian 
and the Eastern-Ukrainian. This article aims to consider broader social implications of the 




ports to show how writing and language standardisation became a central focal point of 
linguistic contestation in Soviet Ukraine. 
The role of the Soviet authorities in creating a standardised Ukrainian language in 
the late 1920s is in the centre of this discussion. The publication of the ‘Charkiv orthogra-
phy’	is	regarded	a	pinnacle	of	the	korenizacija policy, the preferential nationalities policy 
launched in 1923 Union-wide. Nevertheless, as the article shows, the role of the Soviet or-
thographic projects is somewhat overestimated with regards to practical application: the 
core of the writing system was codified, stabilised and even implemented by 1920. Hence, 
the Soviet orthographies were aptly used as a tool in the on-going power-struggle between 
central (Moscow) and local (Charkiv) political actors. The fate of the ‘Charkiv orthogra-
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phy’,	invalidated	by	Soviet	authorities	following	its	1933	condemnation	as	‘bourgeois	na-
tionalist’,	extrapolates	Soviet	Ukraine’s	overall	power	dynamic	at	the	turn	of	the	decade,	
when, despite previous relative political pluralism, any attempts to emphasise a separate 
trajectory of the Ukrainian political and cultural development from the Russian one came 
to be deemed anti-Soviet, as the one rejecting the slogans of the “united family of Soviet 
peoples”, “fraternal friendship” or “proletarian internationalism”. In comparison with the 
1920s, the 1930s represent a break with the attempts to establish a single Ukrainian literary 
standard autonomous of the Russian, introducing Russification of Ukrainophones and the 
policy	of	‘rapprochement	of	languages’	that	altered	the	very	structure	of	Ukrainian	target-
ing its characteristic features and seeking to obliterate its difference with Russian. Needless 
to say, all of the above was brought about by coercive mechanisms that included arrests, 
imprisonments, and executions.
Dwelling on Vakulenko (2009) who sees the 1929 standard as a two-directional pro-
cess,	towards	both	logical	reordering	of	orthography	according	to	the	language’s	underly-
ing principles and autonomising the language by reorienting it towards direct borrowings 
rather than those via Russian, we argue that this linguistic motivation – the marriage of 
Ferdinand	de	Saussure	and	Mykola	Chvyl’ovyj,	that	is,	of	structural	linguistics	and	national	
liberation – was inscribed into the knowledge / power paradigm. Within this paradigm, 
the motivations of finalising the distinctiveness of Ukrainian linguistic community amal-
gamated with the party-driven objectives of social homogenisation as well as gaining in-
fluence on West Ukrainians (the project that Education Commissar Mykola Skrypnyk 
personally cherished). Thus, different groups taking part in this process used a variety of 
techniques	 (such	as	 ‘the	First	Congress’	or	 ‘protection	 from	writing’	 argumentation)	 to	
assert its power of performative utterance. From the perspective of field theory, it repre-
sented a merger of the political field and an academic field, while a Derridean interpreta-
tion suggests a complex dynamic of modernisiation / demodernisation that unfolded in 
1928-1933 around Ukrainian orthography.
1. Theoretical Framework ‘Linguistic Market’ and ‘Protecting Language from Writing’ 
Pierre Bourdieu conceptualised the social formation of language through the concept 
of linguistic community as a “product of political domination” that forms and is formed by 
its own “linguistic market” (Bourdieu 2012: 46). Sociologically speaking, he accepted the 
distinction between purely linguistic acts and “performative utterances” (Bourdieu 2012: 
74) that constitute a social act in itself and are invested with symbolic power to carry legal 
consequences (as in a swearing in or a naming of a ship). However, he also insisted that 
eventually many non-performative acts, including the ones that explicitly define a linguis-
tic community (especially if it is contested) possess this symbolic power effect. Establishing 
a codified prescribed standard of written language falls within this category; moreover, this 
act of making / unmaking a community blends together power and knowledge in a way 
fundamental for the French sociologist: 
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Specifically political action is possible because agents, who are part of the social world, 
have a (more or less adequate) knowledge of this world and because one can act on the 
social world by acting on their knowledge of this world. This action aims to produce and 
impose representations (mental, verbal, visual or theatrical) of the social world which 
may	be	capable	of	acting	on	this	world	by	acting	on	agents’	representation	of	it.	Or,	more	
precisely, it aims to make or unmake groups – and, by the same token, the collective ac-
tions they can undertake to transform the social world in accordance with their interests 
– by producing, reproducing or destroying the representations that make groups visible 
for themselves and for others (Bourdieu 2012: 127). 
The primacy of the written language is of special importance for the present discus-
sion. As Joseph Vachek (1989) demonstrated from a functional linguistics perspective, the 
written language is functionally autonomous from the spoken language. More broadly and 
with further reaching implications, Jacques Derrida (1967: 29-30) criticised the modern 
linguistics preoccupation with phoneme and consideration of writing as a derivative en-
dowed with the function to represent the somehow more fundamental, originary spoken 
word. In this, the founding father of structural linguistics Ferdinand de Saussure who con-
ceptualised the spoken word as the sole object of linguistics continued the tradition that 
began	with	Aristotle’s	 definition	of	 spoken	words	 as	 symbols	 of	mental	 experience	 and	
written words as symbols of spoken words, thus secondary of the former. 
Writing would thus have the exteriority that one attributes to utensils; to what is even an 
imperfect tool and a dangerous, almost maleficent, technique […]. It is less a question of 
outlining than of protecting, and even of restoring the internal system of the language in 
the purity of its concept against the gravest, most perfidious, most permanent contami-
nation which has not ceased to menace, even to corrupt that system (Derrida 1967: 34). 
The aporia here resides in the supposedly independent status of the spoken language, 
whereby writing is its representational derivative that somehow manages to “usurp” (Sau-
ssure’s	terminology)	the	main	role	and	is	thus	seen	as	a	treacherous,	malleable,	dangerous	
thing to protect the pure language from. As the article will demonstrate, the cornerstone 
of the language debates in the 1920s was the question of how to best protect the Ukrai-
nian language from its writing. The 1920s debate remained largely within the confines of 
Western	modernity,	with	linguists	advocating	for	‘distancing	the	writing	from	Russian’	in	
a characteristic modernist move towards autonomy and structure-building while the au-
thorities’	eventual	demand	to	‘push	it	back	towards	Russian’	represented	an	essentially	de-
modernising manoeuvre. 
2. Writing Makes the Language: The Ukrainian Graphical Way from Abstand to Ausbau 
The centrality of writing was not the invention of the twentieth century but a more 
generic modern phenomenon. Creating a new standard language involved primarily creat-
ing a written language. It is no wonder that both intra-Ukrainian language feuds, such as 




imperial persecutions, such as the Valuev circular or the Ems decree, concerned exclusively 
the written language, while there is virtually nothing in the major language controversies 
on the spoken vernacular that existed in the form of Abstand language (Klos 1967) and was, 
as it seems, almost of no interest to the parties involved. 
As Remy (2005: 189) argued, “from the 1820s onward, the orthographic discussion 
was dictated and motivated mainly by the political orientations of the participants”. Ap-
plying	Einar	Haugen’s	four-part	model	of	language	planning,	Yavorska	(2010:	165-166)	sug-
gested the following periodisation for the Ukrainian language: 
1. norm selection (1790s-1840s); 
2. codification (1840s-1910s); 
3. implementation (1920s-1940s); 
4. elaboration (1950s-ongoing). 
While not without grounds in sociolinguistic processes, such clear-cut scheme is still 
problematic, especially given the concurrent development of the stages. In the absence of 
a single power centre, making the Abstand language into an Ausbau language by writing 
was a chaotic process. Between 1798 and 1905, there were nearly fifty different graphisa-
tions of the Ukrainian (Ohijenko 1990: 15-22). However, not all systems were equally de-
veloped and widely used. When the New Standard Ukrainian (nsu) was first put into use 
by Ivan Nekraševyč1	 and	Ivan	Kotljarevs’kyj	 in	 the	1780s-1790s,	 its	orthography	was	 im-
plicitly formulated under influence of the Church Slavonic orthography of the Meletian 
recension and prostaja mova	(cfr.	Kryms’kyj	1929:	178-179).	The	etymological	orthography	
oriented towards ensuring accessibility by Great Russians was further developed by Mychaj-
lo Maksymovyč in his diacritic system while the educational spread of the Great Russian 
pronunciation rules stimulated writers interested in accessing a broad Ukrainian public to 
use the Russian graphic in jaryžka	favoured	by	the	Russian	imperial	government	(Kryms’kyj	
1929: 180-181). Since 1853, Pantelejmon Kuliš boldly compiled a number of earlier dispersed 
innovations in the so-called kulišivka (dropping ы, and introducing є and i borrowed 
from	Oleksij	Pavlovs’kyj’s	1818	graphisation).	His	two-volume	collection	Zapiski o Južnoj 
Rusi (‘Notes on Southern Rus’),	1856-1857,	and	Hramatka (an abc) for Ukrainian Sunday 
Schools, 1857, became one of the first examples of books printed in this new phonetic or-
thography.	Later	on,	it	was	also	used	for	Taras	Ševčenko’s	Kobzar (1860) and the first Ukrai-
nian monthly in the Russian Empire, Osnova, published in St Petersburg in 1861-1862. 
1 It seems that he has to be considered among creators of the new idiom alongside 
Kotljarevs’kyj	(see	Danylenko	2008:	103).	
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Kuliš’s	phonetic	orthography,	although	a	milestone	in	the	Ukrainian	cultural	devel-
opment, did not become standard for the Ukrainian literary language. The 1860s, despite 
initial hopes for democratisation of the Russian autocracy2, witnessed further repressions 
in response to numerous student unrests and revolutionary activities, intensified Polish 
separatist and Ukrainophiles movements. On 30 July 1863, a tsarist minister of Internal 
Affairs Petr Valuev issued a so-called Valuev Circular, a secret instruction, placing limits on 
Ukrainian-language publications, stating “no separate Little Russian language ever existed, 
does not exist, and could not exist”3. The Circular banned publication of religious and 
educational books in Ukrainian, limiting its usage primarily to belles-lettres. Consequent-
ly, the Ems Decree from 1876 further restricted the use of the Ukrainian language, now 
banning the publication of all Ukrainian books and their import from abroad. These re-
strictions remained in force until the first Russian Revolution of 1905 (Remy 2007; Miller 
2000; Saunders 1995; Weeks 1996). 
In the meantime, all the Ukrainian-language publications and journalist activities 
were moved abroad, especially to Austrian Galicia. Western Ukraine saw the combination 
of etymological orthography and gradual adoption of kulišivka; for a time, a Latin gra-
phisation	by	Oleksandr	Lozyns’kyj	was	in	governmental	use	(Čornovol	2001).	Mychajlo	
Drahomanov came up with his original system that, however, did not take hold. Eventu-
ally, the 1885 development of kulišivka	by	Jevhen	Želechivs’kyj	–	želechivka with a broad 
use of ї and other peculiarities – became the official orthography used in Austrian Ukraine 
since 1893. The modification of želechivka by Borys Hrinčenko used in his fundamental 
Dictionary of the Ukrainian Language (published 1907-1909) marked the final stage of the 
orthographic codification: with its no separation of -ся, no ї after palatalised consonants, 
use of apostrophe, the orthography of the core vocabulary was finally stabilised. Hence, the 
tenet of Rowenczuk (1992) that placed the peak of standardisation process between 1909 
and 1929 appears only partially true. 
Nonetheless, the above-mentioned graphisation endeavours for the Ukrainian lan-
guage had limited ramifications and did not evolve into a standardised orthography for the 
Ukrainian language approved and used on the entire territory of Ukraine. The main rea-
sons for the failure of the above-discussed language reforms were, of course, a lack of gov-
ernmental interest in standardising the written language and a non-existent school system 
(cfr. Bourdieu 1992: 48)4. Not surprisingly, language reforms were given new impetus by 
the February revolution of 1917, which initiated different projects of national state-build-
ing	on	Ukraine’s	territory.	The	language	question	entered	the	agenda	of	both	the	Ukrai-
nian	People’s	Republic	(Ukrajins’ka Narodna Respublika, unr), formed on 20 November 
2 On reforms and democratisation attempts in late imperial Russia see: Pipes 1970, Rogger 
1983, Waldron 2007. 
3 The translation of the Valuev Circular can be found in Magocsi (2010: 393-94) 
4 The importance and the political use of schooling for language standardisation in the So-
viet Union in the 1920s was discussed in, Pauly 2014; Smith 1998; Ewing 2006; Holmes 1991. 
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1917 and proclaimed independent on 22 January 1918, and the Soviet Republic in Ukraine, 
which existed under various names from December 19175.
The unr leaders devoted much attention to de-Russification of all spheres of public 
life, aimed at accelerated development of national identity and national culture. Already 
on 22 April 1917, a national legislative authority, Central’na Rada (Central Rada), declared 
its course on the sweeping Ukrainization of the republic, yet focusing mainly on the army 
and schooling (dzz: 69-71; Ševčenko 2013). These daring endeavours, however, required 
standardising the Ukrainian language first. Thus, in 1917, an orthographic commission 
chaired by Ivan Ohijenko, a well-known Ukrainian academic and future unr Minister 
for Education was formed. The Commission was tasked with developing the Major Rules 
(Holovniši pravyla) of Ukrainian language, officially endorsed in April 1918. 
Nevertheless, due to the instability of the civil war years, the implementation of these 
reforms was postponed until later. The project finally was published in January 1919 and 
developed into the Most Essential Rules (Najholovniši pravyla). With some corrections, it 
was approved by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (vuan) in April 1919. This codifica-
tion was confirmed by the Soviet authorities in 1920 (Nimčuk 1999: 250-251). In 1921, the 
developed	version	of	Ohijenko’s	rules	was	adopted	by	the	Lviv	Ševčenko	Scientific	Soci-
ety (with modifications such as non-use of apostrophe, broader use of ґ and ль in loan 
words	–	cfr.	Simovyč,	Rudnyc’kyj	1949).	With	these	developments,	Ukrainian	for	the	first	
time received an orthography that was officially implemented by state authorities and ac-
cepted in both major literary traditions (Dnieper and Western Ukraine), despite a number 
of disagreements retained in practice. As such, the Most Essential Rules constitute the first 
empowered orthography forming the basis for all further Ukrainian writing projects. From 
this vantage point, the emphasis on the 1929 project in the current historiography and lack 
of interest to the 1917-1921 language reforms seems disproportionate at best (even though 
it can be explained by the superficial and haphazard level of codification in the earlier at-
tempts as compared to the elaborate Charkiv rules). This interpretation sets the stage for a 
new perspective on the 1929 orthography. 
3. Language and Power: Different Views on Soviet Ukraine 
Undeniably, the intensity of the language debates during the 1920s was enabled by 
the relative political pluralism in Soviet Ukraine in the wake of the revolution and the civil 
wars. Similarly, the fate of the Ukrainian orthography in the 1930s extrapolates the radical 
shift in the balance of political powers between the all-Union centre (Moscow) and the 
peripheries (in our case, Charkiv). To understand the trajectory of language, and more 
5	 The	name	of	the	Soviet	Republic	in	Ukraine	changed	from	Ukrainian	People’s	Republic	
of Soviets (adopted by the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in December 1917), Ukrainian 
Soviet Republic, proclaimed on 19 March 1918 and Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, declared on 
10 March 1919. 
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broadly, cultural reforms in Soviet Ukraine, it is necessary to provide an overview of the 
political negotiations between different actors within the Soviet camp in Ukraine. 
The Soviet regime in Ukraine was only established in 1921, when the Bolsheviks suc-
ceeded in occupying its entire territory6. And yet, this victory presented the Bolshevik lead-
ership with a number of challenges. One of the most vital tasks was the need to neutral-
ise numerous political and ideological opponents, who claimed their right to represent the 
Ukraine’s	toiling	masses,	composed	of	the	republic’s	proletariat	and	the	peasantry,	and	sought	
an independent communist Ukraine. The ideological heterogeneity of the communist camp 
in Ukraine was observed by Moisej Ravič-Čerkasskij, the first historian of the kp(b)u [Com-
munist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine, Komunistyčna Partija Bil’šovykiv Ukraїny], who sug-
gested that the history of the kp(b)u was “a sum of two histories: that of the Ukrainian pro-
letariat and that of the Russian proletariat in Ukraine” (Ravič-Čerkasskij 1923: 5). 
Accordingly, there were two distinct ideological roots in the kp(b)u, one extend-
ing from the Russian Revolutionary movement and another from the Ukrainian socialist 
movement. The first camp was represented by former ideologists and members of the Rus-
sian Social-Democratic Workers Party (Bolsheviks) (rsdrp(b), the Mensheviks, and Rus-
sian Socialist revolutionaries (srs) in Ukraine, who after their merger with the Bolshevik 
party contributed to a pan-imperial horizon, with clear orientation towards an all-Russian 
political space and support to the idea of unchanged political borders and, as before, a cen-
tralist government. Consequently, they contributed to strengthening a centralised vision 
of the Soviet Union and a single Communist party leadership. Conversely, the descendants 
from the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Working Party (usdrp) and the Ukrainian srs 
(upsr) after their merger with the kp(b)u in 1920 continuously asserted a separatist orien-
tation,	advocating	Ukraine’s	broadest	autonomy	in	political,	economic	and	cultural	mat-
ters. This Ukrainian wing in the kp(b)u, also known as Ukrainian national communism, 
focused on the rebirth of the Ukrainian nation within its ethnic boundaries, defending the 
idea of a self-standing Communist party and a loose federation with other Soviet republics 
(Velychenko 2015; Palko 2014; Mace 1983; Majstrenko 1954). 
The two different political horizons, developed during the 1920s parallel to each other 
within the institutional framework of the kp(b)u, contributed to the on-going debates 
about the sovereignty of Soviet Ukraine, the status of its Communist party, as well as the 
implementation	of	all-Soviet	policies	within	the	republic’s	borders,	especially	the	nation-
alities policy of korenizacija. Korenizacija	(literally,	‘rootenisation’	or	‘indigenisation’)	was	
adopted at the Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (rkp(b)7, 
held in April 1923. As defined, the new Soviet nationalities policy was meant to fight both 
“Great-Russian chauvinism” and any manifestations of local nationalism (Stalin 1953: 269-
6	 On	 the	 Ukrainian-Soviet	War	 see:	 Udovyčenko	 1995;	Mirčuk	 1957;	 Kul’čyc’kyj	 1996;	
Mazepa 1934; Borys 1960; Adams 1963. 
7 The name was changed to vkp(b) - the All-Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 
1925, and finally the kpss, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, until 1991. 
74 Roman Horbyk, Olena Palko
81) by “systematically promoting the national consciousness of its ethnic minorities and 
establishing for them many of the characteristic institutional forms of the nation-state” 
(Martin 2001: 1). At the same time, encouraging ethnic diversity (or ethnic particularism) 
was seen as a tool in the Bolshevik grand “modernisation campaign” (Hirsch 2005). 
The 1923 rkp(b) Resolution on korenizacija was followed by similar decrees passed by 
the Central Committee (ck) of the kp(b)u. Ukraine-minded communists, however, quick-
ly took charge over the implementation of this all-Soviet policy in the republic, redefining 
its rationale and scope. For the Ukrainian communists, korenizacija predominantly meant 
Ukrajinizacija, the continuation of the pre-revolutionary initiative of an accelerated nation-
building, executed by the national governments in 1917-1919. Not surprisingly, the two chief 
Ukrainisers	of	the	1920s,	the	People’s	Commissars	for	Education	Oleksandr	Šums’kyj	(in	
office 1924-1927) and Mykola Skrypnyk (1927-1933) were the main representatives of the 
Ukrainian horizon, the Ukrainian national communist group in the kp(b)u, and continu-
ously defended its separate status within the Soviet Union. Consequently, the ideological 
heterogeneity of the Communist party in Ukraine, as the paper argues, created precondi-
tions for a fully-fledged cultural development of Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s, marked by a 
unique period of cultural flowering in Ukraine. 
Worth mentioning, however, is that the vision of the Soviet Ukrainisers differed sig-
nificantly from the previous attempts to de-Russify the republic, executed by the unr and a 
short-lived Hetmanate (Het’manat, or the Ukrainian State), that existed with a significant 
German support in April-December 1918 (Ševčenko 2013; Hunczak 1977). The difference 
was mainly ideological. Unlike their predecessors, the promoters of Soviet Ukrajinizacija 
dreamed of a self-standing Soviet Ukraine, where both national and social questions would 
be successfully resolved. At the same time, this separatist Ukrajinizacija project ran counter 
to the vision of korenizacija, as defined centrally. Despite the fact that both interest groups 
promoted Ukrainian, the use of the language differed significantly. Whereas the Ukraine-
minded activists saw the Ukrainian language as a prerequisite for creating a modern urban 
Ukrainian culture with equal appreciation of the traditional social structure (Ukrainian-
speaking peasantry) and the nineteenth century cultural trends, the centralist group used 
the Ukrainian language (the language of the largest ethnic group in the republic) as a nec-
essary concession in order to achieve their far-reaching strategic goals. 
4. The Splendours of Power: The Soviet Ukrainian Orthography 
The course on korenizacija was adopted at the Twelfth rkp(b) Congress in April 
1923. In Soviet Ukraine, it acquired its local denomination, Ukrajinizacija, targeting the 
Ukrainians, a titular nation in the republic. Linguistic de-Russification (which included 
e.g., Ukrajinizacija or Belarusizacija), was one of the key components of the korenizacija 
policy. The promotion of the Ukrainian language and culture was meant to help over-
come Russian century-long cultural dominance and, hence, suspicion to the Bolsheviks, 
seen by many as a Moscow-led and Russian speaking party. Given the primary importance 
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of the Ukrainian language, comprehensive Ukrajinizacija was to be achieved by 1 January 
1926 (Zobinna et al. 1959: 282-286; Martin 2001: 96). Despite the decisiveness of the cen-
tral party leadership, these far-reaching objectives were premature. The main predicament 
for	the	success	of	the	Soviet	plans	in	Ukraine	was	the	fact	that	up	until	the	decade’s	end	
syntactical and orthographical norms for the Ukrainian language were not implemented 
republic-wide. The 1919 Most Essential Rules were indeed adopted and incorporated by the 
Soviet authorities. The Soviet Ukrainian authorities, nonetheless, became the first one to 
intentionally sponsor the effort of language standardisation (Pauly 2014: 25). 
Due to its political importance, the language question was prioritised by the Soviet 
government in Ukraine. Having experienced a number of setbacks during the civil wars, 
the Bolsheviks took steps to tackle Russification and ensure the status of the Ukrainian 
language. At first, this often took a form of promoting the equality of the two languages in 
the republic. For instance, a draft constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, adopted by the Third 
All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets (March 1919), highlighted the adverse consequences 
of “forced Russification”8. As a follow-up, the Ukrainian Commissariat for Education ad-
opted a resolution according to which the official state language was abolished in favour 
of free development of local, commonly spoken languages (Pyrih et al. 1990: 110). More-
over, adherence to the Ukrainian language was highlighted in the Resolution of the ck 
rkp(b) “On the Soviet Rule in Ukraine,” adopted on 4 December 1919. It was stated that 
the Ukrainian language should be regarded as “an instrument for the communist educa-
tion of the working people” and therefore proficiency in the Ukrainian language for civil 
servants and party workers was desired (Zobinna et al. 1959: 60-62). Furthermore, in 1920 
Stalin, the Commissar for Nationalities at the time, made a speech stating the need to in-
troduce national languages into schooling, the judicial system, public administration and 
executive authorities. The same points were reiterated by the Commissar for Nationalities 
at the Tenth Party congress in March 1921 (Borisenok 2006: 66-69). 
The language question was further advanced with the launch of the korenizacija policy 
in 1923. Shortly after, a number of decrees were issued concerning the status of Ukrainian (at-
tempts to proclaim it as the second official language failed due to the opposition of the pro-
Russian party members, insisting to make it another commonly-used language), schooling 
(the Radnarkom Decree On Measures for Ukrajinizacija of Schools, Educational and Cultural 
Institutions (Zobinna et al. 1959, 1: 71-72) and major tasks to regulate political education and 
propaganda in the countryside (Pančuk et al. 1994: 130-132). The most decisive decree on 
Ukrajinizacija, On Measures for Guaranteeing the Equality of Languages and on the Equal 
Development of the Ukrainian Language, was issued on 1 August 1923. It was stated that: 
the formal equality [of languages] […] is not sufficient. […] Russian language has, in fact, 
become	the	dominant	one.	 In	order	to	destroy	this	 inequality,	 the	Workers’-Peasants’	
Government hereby adopts a number of practical measures which, while affirming the 
8 Documents on Ukrajinizacija were published in bru; zztr; Jurčuk 1976; Pančuk et al. 1994. 
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equality of languages of all nationalities on the Ukrainian territory, will guarantee a 
place for Ukrainian language corresponding to the numerical superiority of the Ukrai-
nian people on the territory of the Ukrainian ssr. (Pančuk et al. 1994: 106-109) 
Once all the provisions for a comprehensive language reform were in place, the So-
viet Government initiated the process of language standardisation. On 23 July 1925 the 
Commissariat for Education created a commission tasked to prepare a unified project for 
the	 orthography	 of	 the	Ukrainian	 language.	The	 commission,	 headed	 by	 Šums’kyj,	 the	
Commissar for Education, and later Skrypnyk in the same capacity, included a number 
of authoritative and well-known academics, writers and cultural figures, representatives of 
the pre-revolutionary and new proletarian intelligentsia. “Although nominally chaired by 
the Commissar for Education, the Commission actually worked under the linguist Oleksa 
Synjavs’kyj”	(Hornjatkevyc	1993:	298).	
The Commission took the 1919 Most Essential Rules as the basis for their further 
work. In 1926 it produced a discussion document, in which not only orthography, but also 
morphology, punctuation, and some other areas were covered. Among the language de-
velopers, there were members of the former unr	orthography	commission	Kryms’kyj	and	
Jevhen Tymčenko; Kyjivan literary scholar Serhij Jefremov; young Charkiv writers Majk 
Johansen,	Mychajlo	Jalovyj,	Mykola	Chvyl’ovyj;	and	the	editor-in-chief	of	Charkiv	news-
paper Sil’s’ki Visti (Rural News) Serhij Pylypenko. In addition, representatives from West-
ern	Ukraine	were	 invited,	 including	Roman	Smal’-Stoc’kyj,	Volodymyr	Hnatjuk,	Vasyl’	
Simovyč,	and	Ilarion	Svjencic’kyj.	
The projects of a new orthography developed by the Commission were submitted to 
a general public discussion. The first All-Ukrainian Orthography Conference, symboli-
cally held in the republican capital city of Charkiv, the stronghold of a distinct, moderately 
purist school, took place in May-June, 1927. Altogether, the conference was attended by 
fifty-five scholars, out of them three from Galicia and one Communist functionary from 
Transcarpathia (Ohijenko 1991: 301-302). Over sixty discussion and review articles were 
published in Visti vucvk during the Congress (ibidem). Shortly after, it was accepted by 
the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (Kyjiv) on 31 March 1929, and by the Ševčenko Sci-
entific Society on 29 May 1929. Skrypnyk promulgated the orthography on 6 September 
1929 and required its use in all schools and publications. The orthography, widely known 
as skrypnykivka, was published in Charkiv by the State Publishers of Ukraine in 1929 
(Hornjatkevyč 1993: 300). 
5. The Miseries of Power: Reaction and Repression 
The affirmative attitude of the Soviet authorities and its tolerant attitude towards 
Ukraine’s	cultural	managers	did	not	remain	intact	for	long.	The	major	change	in	the	way	
the	nationalities	policy	was	perceived	and	implemented	occurred	during	the	Stalin’s	‘great	
break’	 in	1928-29.	With	the	 introduction	of	 the	First	Five-Year	Plan,	 the	party	centrally	
initiated	‘hard	line’	policies	in	dealing	with	alleged	class	enemies.	In	historiography,	this	
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period	is	widely	known	as	‘the	cultural	revolution’	conducted,	according	to	Fitzpatrick	by	
the	means	of	‘class	war’	(Fitzpatrick	1978).	Among	those	most	targeted	were	the	so-called	
fellow-travellers, a collective name used for pre-revolutionary intelligentsia who after 1917 
stopped openly opposing the Soviet regime and tacitly accepted it (Trotsky 1923). In addi-
tion, the party took radical stand against any, as perceived, manifestations of local national-
ism,	including	those	‘free-thinkers’,	‘dissenters’	and	national	deviationists	within	the	party.	
Following the 1928 Shakhty trial, a show-trial against a large group of mining en-
gineers and technicians from the Donbas area in Ukraine, charged with conspiracy and 
sabotage,	a	political	confrontation	between	 ‘proletarian’	communists	and	the	old	 ‘bour-
geois’	 intelligentsia	began	 in	 earnest.	 In	Ukraine,	 the	 1928	 trial	was	 followed	by	 several	
major	national	 conspiracies	 and	 terrorist	plots	 ‘unmasked’	 between	 1929	 and	 1934.	The	
most	important	trials	of	the	early	1930s	were	the	trials	over	conspiratorial	‘nationalist’	or-
ganisations: the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (Spilka Vyzvolennja Ukrajiny, svu), 
the Ukrainian National Centre (Ukrajins’kyj Nacional’nyj Centr, unc) and the Ukrainian 
Military Organisation (Ukrajins’ka Vijs’kova Organizacija, uvo). 
The svu trial, held in 1930 at Charkiv Opera Theatre, by right can be defined as the 
most important event for the cultural and national development of Soviet Ukraine. The 
persecution of the forty-five Ukrainian intellectuals, writers and theologians, former poli-
ticians and activists, and vuan leading members, had serious repercussions for the cultural 
and political sphere. Firstly, by eliminating the vuan leadership, the autonomous status 
of this academic institution, granted in the early 1920s, was abolished. By this, the Acad-
emy, the main promoter of academic research and language reforms, was subjugated to the 
political agenda of the Communist Party centrally, who from now on gained control over 
the activity of their members. Secondly, the SVU trial signalled the process of reconsider-
ing the Ukrajinizacija policy, as noted by Pauly: “By tarring Ukrainian literature with the 
slander of nationalism, conflating it with counterrevolutionary reaction, the SVU trial and 
its	 reporting	also	undermined	 the	public’s	 faith	 in	Ukrainization	and	pre-revolutionary	
cultural elites” (Pauly 2014: 249). 
The svu impacted the process of implementing the language reforms. Firstly, the entire 
activity of the Narkompros orthographical commission was scrutinised. The 1929 orthog-
raphy was condemned as “counter-revolutionary” and “bourgeois nationalist” (Masenko 
et al. 2005: 113-132). Consequently, the steps were taken to underplay the achievements of 
the commission and the significance of skrypnykivka. Secondly, the svu trial targeted the 
most ardent supporters of the new language reforms, the teachers. The trial had immense 
scope: some thirty thousand educators and school teachers were arrested all over Ukraine 
(Šapoval et al.	1997:	135).	The	persecutions	against	Ukraine’s	cultural	figures	and	political	
activists continued. For instance, the most prominent convicts of the unc case were the 
two	Ukrainian	academics	Mychajlo	Hruševs’kyj	and	Matvij	Javors’kyj	(Prystajko,	Šapoval	
1999; Bertelsen, Shkandrij 2014); whereas the uvo trial tackled the representatives of the 
higher political echelons. 
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The new perspective on the Ukrainian culture and language was introduced by a ck 
vkp(b) directive “On suppressing Ukrainian nationalism and introducing communist ideas” 
on 3 April 1932. The directive initiated a campaign against alleged bourgeois nationalists and 
was conducted side by side with the industrialisation and collectivisation campaigns. Among 
those	‘bourgeois	nationalists’	were	the	Commissar	for	Education	Skrypnyk	and	other	mem-
bers of the orthography commission, who were arrested shortly thereafter. Skrypnyk was tar-
geted for his activities as the Commissar for Education, which, among others, included the 
approval of the 1929 orthography. The campaign against the Narkompros chief, the so-called 
skrypnykivščyna emphasised the underlying political aspects of the language reforms: 
Despite the svu	trial,	the	Commissariat	for	Education’s	old	leadership	championed	by	
Skrypnyk did not learn from their mistakes; they did not fight nationalism and signifi-
cantly neglected the language front, this important sphere in advancing the Ukrainian 
Soviet culture. (up: 3-5; Masenko et al. 2005: 108-109).
Eventually, the Ukrajinizacija policies were curtailed and Soviet ethnic particular-
ism was replaced by the ideology of all-Union uniformity and Russification. Following the 
mood of the decade, the 1929 orthography was quickly defined as “nationalistic”; its cre-
ators were labelled “Ukrainian fascists” (Chvylja 1933; Masenko et al. 2005: 120). In 1933, a 
chief party propagandist and a deputy Commissar for Education Andrij Chvylja published 
an article in the official newspaper “Bil‘šovyk Ukrajiny” with a telling title To Eradicate, to 
Exterminate the Nationalistic Roots on the Language Front (Chvylja 1933; Masenko et al. 
2005: 112-132). The article later appeared as a separate brochure and was distributed re-
public-wide. The previous orthographic commission was accused by Chvylja of “directing 
the	Ukrainian	language	along	the	nationalistic	lines”	(Chvylja	1933).	Skrypnyk’s	language	
reforms were seen as means of “constructing barriers between the Ukrainian Soviet culture 
and	the	Russian	Soviet	culture”	and	redirecting	the	trajectory	of	Ukraine’s	cultural	devel-
opment “towards bourgeois-nationalist path” (Masenko et al. 2005: 116). By this, Skrypnyk 
was put in line with the unr leaders and the Ukrainian nationalists in Galicia, who, as 
asserted by Chvylja, repeatedly tried to orient the Ukrainian language and culture towards 
the “bourgeois Europe” and, thus, against “the fraternal union with the Russian culture 
[seen as] Asiatic language and culture” (Masenko et al. 2005: 120). 
Chvylja was later appointed chair of a new orthographic commission, tasked to devel-
op a new and ideologically correct orthography of the Ukrainian language. Unlike in 1925-
29, the new orthography was initiated from above by a party directive. No public discus-
sion	followed.	The	main	objective	of	Chvylja’s	commission	was	to	tackle	the	“intentional	
distortions” of the previous orthography, which intended to “Westernise” the Ukrainian 
(up: 4). Instead of “bourgeois” Polish and Czech influences, the new orthography was to 
highlight the similarities between the Ukrainian and Russian languages, which would play 
into the hand of Moscow communist ideologists, who by the time had started to promote 
the image of “fraternal peoples” and the historical unity of the Slavic people under the wise 
leadership of the Communist party. 
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6. Comparing Orthographies and the Two Faces of Soviet Modernisation 
It is now time to turn to the orthographies themselves and trace how these power strug-
gles found reflection and had impact on codification of writing rules and even graphisation 
of Ukrainian. While the 1928 and, to a lesser extent, the 1933 systems have been studied (cfr. 
Hornjatkevyč 1993; Masenko et al. 2005; Vakulenko 2009; Orazi forthcoming), the earlier, 
de facto pre-Soviet codifications, peaking at The Most Essential Rules remain on the periphe-
ry for both historians and linguists (and unduly so). Hence, the present discussion suggests 
a focus on the quantitative comparison of these three codifications, something that has been 
rather overlooked previously. While the character of the changes between the three is cru-
cial to understand, the very scope of these changes is vital for understanding the significance 
and particular standing of the codifications as regards to the language they codified. 
For this analysis, the codifications were broken down into calculable units, individual 
rules, defined here as a prescriptive statement on a particular speech situation or type of sit-
uations and differentiable from other such statements (table 1). This quantitative analysis 
has its limitations, however, since orthographies are difficult to quantify. Their paragraphs 
often contain more than one rule and sometimes no rules at all; therefore, the norms have 
to be extracted from the texts deductively by way of coding, which must necessarily be 
taken with some scepticism. The key challenge is to define what qualifies as an individual 
rule or norm and what does not. The normative statements are sometimes given in notes 
or in passing, and their often ambiguous formulations and policies that allow linguistic 
variance inevitably create irregularities. Equally difficult is to compare systematically the 
codifications that vary in their levels of detalisation. Still, this analysis is precise enough for 
the purposes in mind and provides an overall understanding of the scope of changing and 
resilient patterns in the three orthographies. 
 1921 1929  1933
Number of norms: 64 400 389 
New norms N/A 336 41 
Norms cancelled N/A 4 16 
Norms ignored N/A 4 36 
Of them:    
Suffixes regulated 12 46 34 
Declination norms 17 213 198 
Loan words rules 14 33 21 
Proper names rules 0 22 13 
table 1. 
Quantitative comparison of the three major Ukrainian orthographies in the 1920s and 1930s 
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From this quantitative perspective, the 1929 orthography represents a dramatic ex-
pansion of the set of rules (from 64 prescriptive statements to 400), while the 1933 system, 
on the contrary, represents a shrinking of the normative scope to 389 rules (even though 
it added 41 completely new rules, chiefly in what concerns the writing of acronyms and 
punctuation). The code shrank especially in the chapters covering proper names and loan 
words where nearly half of the previous norms were either cancelled or simply ignored and 
not mentioned. But even in the suffixes, declension and conjugation chapters the number 
of norms fell, so that for example out of 46 suffixes normativised in 1929 only 34 survived 
in 1933. As a result, not only did the structure of language simplify, but also the diversity 
of productive paradigms and stylistic repertoires, with orthography once again influencing 
the structure of the spoken language. 
Skrypnykivka was much more traditionalist and inclusive in its attitude to the preced-
ing system, cancelling only four norms of the 1921 code and ignoring other four. In fact, 
while 1933 is scathing in treatment of the Charkiv norms (overall, only some 250 normati-
visations remained, or around 60%), in some ways it may represent a certain relative and 
partial	rollback	to	the	1921	code,	for	example	by	taking	to	the	extreme	the	latter’s	tendency	
to minimise the use of ґ and prefer hard л over the soft ль in loan words. In total, well over 
70%	(47	individual	rules)	of	the	1921	norms	can	still	be	found	in	Chvylja’s	orthography,	
which is notably better than the continuity with the 1928. 
Also,	Ohijenko	and	Kryms’kyj’s	code	was	oriented	rather	towards	the	needs	of	prac-
titioners such as schoolteachers, bureaucrats and journalists. Thanks to this, it focused on 
generalities in a much more superficial way, similar also for the 1933 text that certainly lacks 
the	1929’s	fundamental	academic	approach.	The	emphasis	in	1921	was	on	the	writing	rules	
for the core language corpus that would not have yielded to sweeping changes without 
overturning key paradigms and even the dialectal foundation of the standard language, 
which	would	have	contradicted	the	more	careful	Stalinist	planners’	tactic	to	target	recent	
and less strongly established norms and thus create the appearance of language improve-
ment rather than redrawing the core rules.
Unwillingly perhaps, the Soviet language planners solidified the foundational status 
of the 1917-1921 codification efforts but also – more willingly in this respect – returned the 
codification of the Ukrainian to an earlier stage, before a number of inconsistencies and 
omissions of the early effort had been at least partly solved. 
The especially radical change in the orthography of loan words (often reversing not 
only the 1929 suggestions but also the 1921 rules) and proper names hints to the political 
character of the language autonomy problem. The Charkiv orthography tried to establish 
the practice of borrowing words from foreign languages directly rather than via Russian, 
and this was reversed most consistently. Unlike the core corpus where at least the majority 
of the 1921 basic rules survived, foreign borrowings became the key battleground against 
the modernist autonomy of the 1928 planners. Only 6 out of 20 norms for loan words in 
1921 code remained in force after 1933. Out of 33 rules for the orthography of loan words 
in the 1929 code, 10 were left largely intact, 2 were essentially modified, 11 cancelled and 
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10 simply ignored (ignoring previously normativised rules being a typical tactic of the 
Stalinist planners). 
Focusing famously on the ґ/г, л/ль and т/ф problems, the 1933 orthography aban-
doned the modernist/structuralist principle of forging internally consistent and systematic 
principles in favour of heteronomic orientation towards Russian, but also the indigenous 
tradition and changing the graphisation of the language, for example by removing the let-
ter ґ from the alphabet, firmly entrenched by 1917 in practice, allowed by The Most Es-
sential Rules and meticulously normativised by skrypnykivka. The sole rule for rendering 
loan words and foreign proper names became, in essence, ‘write it the way it is written in 
Russian’,	importing	the	Russian’s	own	internal	contradictions	and	idiosyncrasies	instead	of,	
so	to	speak,	developing	one’s	own.	
A similar process concerned the orthography for proper names (not discussed in 
1917-1921 but detailed in 22 individual rules in 1929). Only 6 of those rules remained, 4 
were tweaked significantly, 3 cancelled and 9 once again not mentioned. Thus the premise 
for Soviet modernisation was shaped: new ideas and technologies (prominently featured 
among loan words) could only enter Ukrainian through the control of the Russian lan-
guage, and names of people and places could not be too distinctly Ukrainian. What Ch-
vylja	aimed	for	was	regulation	of	the	language’s	autonomy	and	distinction.	
The sharp rise in complexity and detail of codification in the 1929 orthography, its 
radical utopianism of dialectal inclusivity and rationalist structuralism represent the high 
point of modernity and modernisation effort in Ukraine as long as it comes to language 
policy, whereas the subsequent decline in complexity, diversity, detalisation and rational 
systematicity of the codification in 1933 testify to the essentially de-modernising policy 
of the Soviet authorities towards Ukrainian following the demise of national communist 
horizon	in	the	party	and	Skrypnyk’s	suicide	on	7	July	1933.	This	is	evident	from	the	quanti-
tative data above but also from the closer qualitative comparison between the codes. 
The 1933 codification systematically excluded all the attempts present in the text of 
skrypnykivka to discuss orthoepy and pronunciation, the link between the written lan-
guage and the spoken speech. Thus, while the Charkiv project implicitly recognised the 
Derridean	dependence	of	language	on	writing,	Chvylja’s	orthography	very	clearly	sought	
to severe this link and eliminate the phonological and articulatory, grammatical, morpho-
logical prescriptions dictated by skrypnykivka, as well as its narrative on the history of the 
language. Equally interesting is that the changes in the illustrative examples show not only 
the	purging	of	dissident	authors,	such	as	Chvyl’ovyj	or	Hruševs’kyj,	and	adding	examples	
from Lenin, Ivan Mykytenko or Pavlo Postyšev, but also choosing those examples from 
classics such as Ševčenko that could only be related to the context of class struggle, and re-
moving most things concerning village life and traditional agriculture. Interesting to note 
is a moralising approach, whereby such examples as pljuvaty	‘to	spit’,	bljuvaty	‘to	vomit’	or	
sp’janilyj	‘drunken’	all	were	censored	out	of	the	1933	orthography.	
The 1933 language planners surely used the modernising rhetoric of improvement and 
cultivation as well as tried to ground the success of the new orthography not only in co-
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ercion but in some rationalising and simplifying motions. For the broad public it did rep-
resent some carrots alongside the usual sticks, such as simpler though less logical rules for 
teachers and pupils or more commonalities to Russian for non-native speakers with poor 
familiarity with literary Ukrainian. 
7. Conclusion 
Modernity can be characterised by three foundational features: irreversible dynamisa-
tion that opens up a vista of endless reconstruction, ambivalent rationalisation focused on 
grounding agency in rational principles, and differentiating universalisation which at once 
separates social fields and establishes for them universal frames of reference (Fornäs 1995: 
20-32). From the perspective of orthography as understood by Derrida, modernity epito-
mised in modern linguistics treated writing as, first of all, secondary to the spoken word 
and, secondly, as a potential danger that can subvert the primary oral substance of lan-
guage, thus in fact putting written language in the central position of language discussions. 
Even prior to 1917, the Ukrainian orthographic debates were premised on this cen-
trality of writing, the issues of orthography and alphabet discussed most passionately and 
grammar or vocabulary only following them because their problems stand closer to those 
of writing; only then syntax, morphology or orthoepy were even considered. The classical 
Shevelovian example – the alleged decline of hard pronunciation before i (гострий ніж 
vs більше ніж type) – has practically faced almost no debate because of its insignificance 
for writing as long as želechivka went off the table, although this concerns the phonemic 
structure of Ukrainian, something that makes it systematically different. 
In this context, it seems too hasty to derive a clear periodisation from the history of 
codification	of	 the	New	Standard	Ukrainian,	 in	particular	 the	one	based	upon	Haugen’s	
four stages. The Ukrainian situation seriously challenges this theory and calls for a better 
scheme because it has tended to experience three or even all four stages happening simulta-
neously as well as revisit the stages that seemed completed. In particular, the 1920s and 1930s 
(marked	by	Yavorska	[2010]	as	the	‘implementation’	phase)	witnessed	in	fact	the	fiercest	and	
most radical struggle around the norm selection and codification as has been demonstrated 
by contemporary studies, including this article. The lack of debate in Soviet Ukraine regard-
ing the language matters since the 1950s may as well represent the final stage of elaboration. 
However, at the very least, such view fails to take into account the use of parallel standards 
in diasporas and problematisation of using Soviet norms post-1991. As the alternatives to the 
official standard do have some currency in Ukraine, the ghosts of the stages of norm selec-
tion and codification (recodification this time indeed!) are looming again on the horizon.
In the context of this, the Ukrainian orthographic perils of the 1920s partook of 
the aporias of modernity. While the 1917-1921 codifications shaped and reconfirmed key 
norms, their scope was limited, and the 1929 project – using a typical modernist legitimis-
ing technique of a language congress – sought to reconstruct the norm, rationalise it and 
at the same time differentiate and universalise Ukrainian. In it, it constructed the idea of 
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orthography as at once following the spoken word and protecting it, thus actively interven-
ing in the realms of orthoepy, phonology, morphology, grammar, and history of language. 
It was modernist, Saussurean enterprise through and through. 
‘First	Congress’	was	in	itself	a	not	unpopular	language	planning	tool;	altogether	they	
number about 30, as counted by Joshua Fishman. However, one would never hear about 
the first congress of French, English or Russian. Typically, it was a technique employed by 
postcolonial (Hindi, Wolof or Indonesian), contested (Catalan or Dutch in Belgium), or 
otherwise disempowered languages of stateless nations (typically in Eastern Europe: Yid-
dish, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Macedonian) or those that required a speedy Europeanisation 
(Turkish, but possibly also Ukrainian and other East European) (cfr. Fishman 1993: 4-5). 
The 1933 orthography, on the contrary, drew its legitimacy from the power of hier-
archical coercion rather than collective action of intellectuals, and needed no congress. It 
dramatically reduced the complexity of the norm, abandoned a number of internal ratio-
nalising principles and pushed Ukrainian towards unificatory universalisation that how-
ever gravitated to another language, Russian, rather than itself. The differentiation of the 
academic and governmental fields was also weakened, and rather than grounding political 
action in knowledge (cfr. Bourdieu 2012: 127, quoted in theory section above), the relation-
ship was reversed as now knowledge had to be grounded in political action. This approach 
makes it essentially a de-modernising effort that rather prioritised Sovietisation and sought 
to destroy the representation that made Ukrainians a separate community offering another 
in which they were part of a common community with Russians. Of course, Sovietisation 
had to be masked as modernisation, hence the use of modernist rhetoric of reconstruc-
tion, protecting the “authentic” speech from “bad” writing; not least, the modernist drive 
towards	reconstruction	and	rationalising	 improvement	facilitated	Chvylja’s	orthography	
in passing for a modernising project. 
There was another important and long-lasting implication of the 1933 orthography, 
however. In the introduction, it was said that the 1929 orthography was adopted to “arti-
ficially tear the Ukrainian language away from the language of the millions of Ukrainians, 
of the Ukrainian workers and peasants; [it was] the departure of the Ukrainian language 
away from the Russian language” (up: 3-5; Masenko et al. 2005: 108-110). Hence, the domi-
nant role of the Russian language in everyday life of Ukrainian cities and industrial centres 
was restated. This, however, annulled the decade-long attempts of numerous Ukrainian 
communists to introduce the Ukrainian language and culture into urban and historically 
Russified spaces. 




diate target since it could make the process appear to be non-voluntary. The key predica-
ment was the national heterogeneity of the working class, which at the time included many 
non-Ukrainians and russified Ukrainians, who identified themselves as Ukrainians but 
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whose	native	 language	was	Russian.	The	Commissar	 for	Education	Šums’kyj	on	numer-
ous occasions highlighted the pivotal importance of broadening Ukrajinizacija to those 
russified Ukrainians, seen as a prerequisite for urban de-Russification. In this, however, 
he was opposed by Stalin himself, who emphasised the difference between the concept of 
Ukrajinizacija of the party and other apparatus (a declared objective of the policy) with 
Ukrajinizacija	of	the	republic’s	proletariat,	which,	according	to	Stalin,	“contradict[ed]	the	
principle of the free development of nationalities [...] and [was] equal to national oppres-
sion” (cdaho: 1-7; translation in Luckyj 1990: 66-68). 
Skrypnyk,	who	succeeded	Šums’kyj	in	the	Narkompros	in	1927,	maintained	Stalin’s	
view on natural and gradual Ukrajinizacija	of	the	working	class.	Skrypnyk’s	tenure	coin-
cided with the first Five-Year Plan. Hence, his steps in office were conditioned by the atmo-
sphere	of	antinationalism	and	‘class	war’.	Thus,	the	new	Commissar	for	Education	shifted	
the emphasis towards greater ideological conformity, advancing the question of proletar-
ian Ukrajinizacija. This was to be achieved through creating a total Ukrainian urban en-
vironment, a favourable setting, in which working masses would either convert or became 
inclined towards the Ukrainian language and new Soviet Ukrainian culture. In 1933, how-
ever, these attempts were condemned as “nationalist twists that had created artificial bar-
riers for the broad Ukrainian masses to become literate” (Masenko et al. 2005: 112-132). 
The pedagogical argumentation strategy citing “difficulties” in the language teaching and 
teachers’	dissatisfaction	with	the	complexity	of	the	Charkiv	rules	was	used	strategically	to	
criticise the orthography (Hornjatkevyč 1993: 300). By this, the question of Ukrajinizacija 
of the working class was taken off the table: the decisive role of the Russian language, “the 
language of the millions of Ukrainians, of the Ukrainian workers and peasants” was given 
an absolute priority in Soviet Ukraine. 
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Abstract
Roman Horbyk, Olena Palko
Righting the Writing. The Power Dynamic of Soviet Ukraine Language Policies and Reforms in the 
1920s-1930s
The first post-revolutionary decades became decisive for the development of the Ukrainian 
language, national culture and identity. The Ukrainian language, previously subject to a number of 
bans, finally entered the stage of intensive status and corpus planning. Thanks to this, it became a 
decisive factor in the rivalry between different forms of statehood vying on the Ukrainian territory 
after 1917. At the same time, the status upgrade and broader public use called for the standardisation 
of the language. The first practical steps towards the unification of different orthographic traditions 
were undertaken from 1918 to 1921. The turbulence of civil war, however, determined the failure of 
comprehensive language reform. Calls for linguistic unification gained new force in the second half 
of the 1920s: with the introduction of Ukrainizacija, the local variant of the all-Union nationalities 




debates on the “correct” codification of the language and the actual steps towards different ideals 
reflect the changing power dynamic between the centre and the republics in the interbellum ussr? 
This is the problem this study sets out to tackle using the example of Soviet Ukraine.
The paper explores the link between language and politics in Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s and 
1930s. While examining the political preconditions for the language policies in Ukraine, significant 
attention will also be devoted to the specifics of the 1928 spelling reform and its reception by the 
general public in Ukraine and abroad. In general, it is argued that in the Soviet Union language was 
often used as a tool of political consolidation, and the power struggle between different visions of 
the future of the republics can be seen in debates and reforms of language. Hence, the correlation 
between Soviet language policies and the subsequent Sovietisation (or Russification) is highlighted.
The subsequent debates around the status of the Ukrainian language, its orthography and vo-
cabulary exposed the unbridgeable differences between the political elites in the republic and pow-
ers in Moscow. The draft of the new orthography was thoroughly discussed by academics and lin-
guists, representing different parts of Ukraine and the final draft was publicly discussed republic-wide. 
The spelling reform, adopted in 1929, can rightly be regarded as one of the greatest achievements of 
Ukrainizacija. This newly-acquired status was significantly challenged by the centralisation drive of the 





from foreign influence, when Russian equivalents and cognates were introduced or prioritised.
Keywords
Korenizacija; Ukrajinizacija; Language Reform; Modernity; Sovietisation.
